Unproven Payment in the Proceeding’s Evidentiary Phase under Mexican Commercial Law

Does a payment made but not proven during the appropriate procedural phase of trial render it ineffective? 

At first glance, this may seem an obvious question, but unfortunately under Mexican commercial law it is not. 

Normative Provision under Critique. 

Article 1397 of the Commercial Code provides as follows: 

“If the matter concerns a judgment, no defense other than payment may be admitted if enforcement is sought within one hundred and eighty days; if that period has elapsed but not more than one year, defenses of settlement, set-off and arbitration agreement shall also be admitted; and if more than one year has passed, defenses of novation—including forbearance, debt reduction, agreement not to sue, or any other arrangement modifying the obligation—and of falsity of the instrument shall also be admissible, provided that enforcement is not sought by virtue of a final judgment, agreement or pending proceeding in the record. All these defenses, except that of falsity, must be subsequent to the judgment, agreement or proceeding, and must be evidenced by public instrument, document judicially authenticated or by judicial confession.” 

Introduction: Issues under interpretation. 

The cited provision admits the defense of payment even at the enforcement stage of the judgment; however, its concluding clause restricts its application to payments made after the date of the judgment. 

In other words, under commercial law, even following a condemnatory judgment, the defendant may invoke payment as a defense at the enforcement stage—but only if the payment in question occurred after the judgment. This raises the question: what becomes of a payment that was in fact made but not proven during the evidentiary phase of a commercial trial?  

The language of the provision seems to treat it as though it never occurred. 

This article advocates for a broader interpretation of the admissibility requirement set forth in Article 1397 of the Commercial Code, recognizing that its true purpose is to avoid relitigating the same defense of payment already pleaded, not to strip validly and timely made payments of their efficacy. 

Implications of the Textual Application of the Cited Statutory Provision. 

Thus, under the text of the provision, picture the most extreme scenario: the plaintiff sues for non-payment (when in fact the debtor did pay), and the proceeding continues in default because the defendant neither pled nor proved payment during the evidentiary phase. In that situation, although payment was timely made, commercial law appears to privilege procedural form over substantive justice: once a final condemns payment that was not evidenced at trial, the defendant may not prove it at the enforcement stage. 

Accordingly, the text of Mexican commercial law does not favor a duly performed payment unless it is proven in the appropriate phase of the proceedings or unless the claim to enforce it has prescribed. Once enforcement proceedings are initiated, it is incumbent on the defendant to establish timely payment—and only during the trial’s evidentiary phase—otherwise the debtor will be condemned to pay despite having already fulfilled the obligation, effectively imposing a double payment. 

Correct interpretation in accordance with fundamental rights and the civil law concept of payment. 

Therefore, while the admissibility requirement in the final clause of Article 1397 serves the legitimate purpose of preventing the re-examination of an already pleaded defense, it must not be construed restrictively. To do so conflicts with the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, which forbids procedural formalism from prevailing over the substantive resolution of a dispute—namely, whether the obligation has been effectively discharged. 

Moreover, payment is, par excellence, the means of fulfilling an obligation and can be refused only for just cause, as set forth by Article 2098 of the Federal Civil Code. It is therefore inconceivable that, although the creditor may not lawfully refuse a proper payment, a mere procedural requirement could nullify a timely performance. 

Under this reasoning, Article 1397 limits the defenses available at the enforcement stage; yet its procedural admissibility requirement, again, must not be read restrictively but rather in favor of substantive justice, so as to avoid condemning a person to double payment when they have timely satisfied their obligation but failed to prove it at trial. 

To hold otherwise would amount to accepting that payment, as a mode of extinguishing obligations, does not actually discharge the debt but instead survives on condition that non-payment is plead and proven at trial—thereby distorting the civil law conception of payment. As Dr. Cortiñas Barajas observes, once a payment is made without lawful refusal, there is no rational basis—neither theoretical nor practical—to presume the obligation persists or a new obligation arises: “that payment extinguishes the debt and should not give rise to any further obligation, since the legal expectations and subjective rights of both parties have been satisfied,” underscoring the bilateral nature of the act. 

Conclusion. 

These considerations, intrinsic to the nature of payment and the effects of its performance, confirm that the procedural admissibility requirement in Article 1397 cannot be limited solely to defenses arising after the judgment. If a payment has not been examined due to lack of opportunity, it should be admissible at any stage of the proceedings; otherwise, procedural form would eclipse substantive justice, exposing the debtor to a double payment. 

To date, although the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation has addressed Article 1397 in relation to certain fundamental rights, it has not analyzed it under Article 17 of the Constitution nor in terms of distorting the figure and consequences of payment as a form of extinguishing obligations. Nevertheless, the interpretation advanced here aligns with our judicial system and the fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. 

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